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The empirical validation of the transaction cost concept proved to be a major intellectual 
endeavour that has yielded only partial success. Particular difficulties have been encountered 
in the measurement of such costs at the micro or macro level. The paper of Wallis and North 
(1986) is one attempt to provide a measure of transaction costs in the national economy. Their 
attempt is to define “transaction sectors” and relate the levels of output (i.e. costs incurred) in 
such sectors to the level of gross national / domestic product. Among these costs one finds: a) 
costs of management, sales, administration and control, b) costs of financing, insurance, 
distribution, c) (some of the costs) of  the public sector / the State. 
Apart from the original research concerning the US, there have been relatively few 
studies describing other economies (e.g. Australia, Argentina, Bulgaria). The paper joins the 
discussion on the macroeconomic interpretation of transaction costs started by Wallis and 
North. While we had hoped to trace the evolution of the transaction sectors as well as the 
pattern of transaction activities in non-transaction sectors as defined above, the availability of 
data prevented us from accomplishing ambitious research tasks. This paper is basically a 
replication of the study Wallis and North (1986) did for the US albeit for a much shorter time 
span (nineteen years). It contains a short description of the methodology used by these 
authors, the application of the method to the data on the Polish economy from the mid-1990s 
to 2014. We compare the findings with Wallis and North and other authors of studies on 
macroeconomic transaction costs and provide some interpretations of the results. Basically, 
our findings are remarkably close to the estimates of other teams. However, serious 
ambiguities in Wallis-North conceptualization make us sceptical as to the merits of this 
research subprogramme within neo-institutional economics. The implications for the 
understanding of economic growth and development remain unclear.1 
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1The earlier versions of this study were presented at the 9th Annual Conference of International Society for New 
Institutional Economics, Barcelona, 22-25 September, 2005 (Sulejewicz, Graca, 2005, Measuring the 
Transaction Sector in the Polish Economy, 1996 – 2002) and at the 4th Conference of the World Interdisciplinary 






Brief introduction of the concept of transaction costs 
 
The dominant paradigm in economic thinking, i.e. neoclassical economic theory 
privileges the market and the use of pricing mechanisms as a form of economic activity. The 
theory contends that, under most circumstances, free market exchanges lead to optimum 
results in allocation of scarce resources. It was the fundamental insight of Ronald Coase to 
note that having adopted such a view, one has difficulty in explaining other forms of 
economic organization, notably the firm. Why should firms exist (where market forces are 
suspended), if it is the market that solves the economic problem?2 His answer was simple but 
then rather unusual for conventional economics: market is not a free good, or more precisely, 
the use of the price system is costly. He called the costs of using the price system “transaction 
costs” (Coase, 1937). 
 
“In order to carry out a market transaction it is necessary to discover who it is 
that one wishes to deal with, to inform people that one wishes to deal with and 
to what terms, to conduct negotiations leading up to a bargain, to draw up the 
contract, to undertake the inspection needed to make sure that the terms of the 
contract are being observed, and so on” (Coase, 1960, p. 15). 
 
The costs of using a market are not merely the costs of information gathering, 
assessment and use (a lot of that is contained in prices) but also safeguarding contractual 
rights (and hence writing, protecting, executing contracts). Thus, critical economists have 
identified: 
a) search and information costs (finding buyers and sellers, communicating with them 
through a stock exchange, fair, or advertising, etc.), 
b) bargaining and decision costs (when writing a contract it is crucial to decide and accept – 
and pay for – the degree of detail of the agreement), 
c) supervision and enforcement costs (we need to monitor the behaviour of our contractors – 
delivery timing, amount and quality of the good/service etc.). 
If buyers or sellers have an incentive to behave opportunistically, they might cheat at 
every stage of the process, they may hide information, pretend to be somebody else (for 
instance a trustworthy company), renege on the contract if they can go away unpunished or 
simply steal the money (e.g. by not replacing a faulty product). Discovering what they are like 
in reality is no easy matter – and is obviously costly.  
Thus “the costs of running the economic system” as described by K. Arrow are a 
separate and nontrivial category of economic life. One should not think that only “outside” 
market transactions are costly in this sense. Internal costs of management / organization may 
also be considerable:  
a) the costs of setting up, maintaining and changing an organization (design), 
 
2 The economic problem is precisely “the allocation of scarce resources that have competing uses” as introduced 




b) the costs of running an organization (information, costs of decision making, monitoring 
the execution of tasks / orders, measuring performance of employees. 
It is argued that transactions are responsible for most overhead costs, so that 
management is a key function contributing to their level but also allowing for their reduction 
(Miller, Vollman, 1985). Let us be clear: cost is not something an economist is happy about, 
economizing on (the sum of) production costs and transaction costs is the objective function 
of any organization, especially, of course, of the business firm (Williamson, 1985). 
Understanding that execution of something that is assumed totally unproblematic in 
neoclassical economics provides the cornerstone to the institutional analysis of the economic 
activity. If transaction costs are zero (as assumed by neoclassicals) then there is no rational 
basis for institutional choice. It does not matter. On the other hand, non-zero transaction cost 
world (as much closer to reality) makes the economic understanding of institutional setups 
and their change possible. 
Consulting any standard textbook shows that in “pure economics” markets and 
managerial transactions are implicitly assumed to take place against a well-defined and well-
behaved political background. “Institutional arrangements consistent with a capitalist market 
order hold, and this means that a particular local, national, or international organization of the 
political economy exists. Of course, the provision of such an organization and the public 
goods associated with it also involve costs. These are political transaction costs. These are, in 
a general sense the costs of supplying public goods by collective action (…)” (Furubotn, 
Richter, 1998, p. 47). These can be the costs of: 
a) setting up, maintaining and changing a system’s formal and informal political 
organization (establishment of the legal framework, the administrative structure, the 
judiciary, educational system, etc.), 
b) running a polity (to build a monopoly of organized violence, defence, legislation, 
administration of justice, etc.). 
Just as before, information, decision making, monitoring, enforcement of compliance 
are all costly. 
All the previously mentioned types of costs can most probably be divided into 
“variable” transaction costs, in the sense that they depend on the volume or number of certain 
transactions and into “fixed” ones. The latter would be the set-up (or change) costs of a new 
basic organization. From the point of view of received theory, these are the costs that have to 
be added to production and transportation costs, the costs that are normally recognized in 
accounting systems of, say, a firm. Unfortunately, such an approach which amounts to 
complementing standard private and public accounting framework (and the theoretical model 
of neoclassical economics) with positive transaction costs is deceptively simple (see below). 
 
Measuring transaction costs  
 
“Empirical studies of transaction costs almost never measure these costs directly” 
(Williamson, 1985 (1998), p. 35). Nevertheless, if the transaction cost as a heuristic device is 
to settle fully into mainstream economics, we need to provide it with precise empirical 
content and a definition allowing measurement. The predominant application of the concept 
and the need for measurement arises in the context of comparative governance of business 




or fully owned subsidiary? At the sectoral level, there have been several, not very formal, 
approaches to the practical measurement of transaction costs in the – so far only national – 
economy. 
Let us take market transaction costs. For instance, prices of similar or identical goods 
are not usually the same over adjacent or even in the same market. Although consumers know 
that price differences are significant for certain products, many avoid expending time, effort, 
and money to find the lowest-price seller. One can reasonably hypothesize that the relative 
price differences (as reported to the average price) may be interpreted as measures of search 
cost avoided by consumers, and therefore, as measures of their own transaction costs. What 
they do not pay as costs they pay as price. Thus costs of marketing would qualify as 
transaction costs. There are standard microeconomic estimates of the difference between 
production costs and the price paid for the commodity by the final consumer (Scherer, 1987). 
When average transport costs and average indirect tax are excluded, the average marketing 
cost may be around 40-50% of the final price. 
Tentative measures of internal managerial transaction costs yield similar magnitudes. If 
we accept, as suggested above, that overhead costs are an approximation of transaction costs, 
their share in total costs (or value added) has, in the US, reached levels between 35% and 
60% (Furubotn, Richter, 1998, p. 51). Since these general administrative costs include 
production costs as well (e.g. utilities, depreciation, repair) a very crude (split) estimate of ½ 
would yield a share of circa 20% transaction costs in total costs of a firm. If profit margins are 
included and “outside” market transaction costs added the sum of market and organizational 
transaction costs may reach 40-60% of the final price paid by consumers. 
We have indicated above that some of these costs are recurrent, i.e. variable. What is 
clear is that, especially, in periods of radical social and economic change, that is in periods 
when new institutions are being built, there must be substantial investment outlays, the costs 
of setting up the new system must be borne. Market transformation in Eastern Europe is a 
paramount example of such systemic change. Is there a way to measure these transaction 
costs? 
Other challenges are in store as well. In practice, it is not easy to distinguish between 
production costs and transaction costs. For example: if production is lost due to delays in 
planning, is it the result of slow planning (transaction costs) or of a technology that cannot 
adapt quickly to late changes in the plan (production costs)? Double sourcing (maintaining 
supplies from two plants) rather than one may be seen as increasing production costs (because 
a firm is renouncing economies of scale) or increasing transaction costs (securing supplies 
given uncertainty and/or opportunistic behaviour on the part of a would-be monopolistic 
supplier). On the other hand, choice of that particular structure may be an ex-post indication 
that other forms of organizing supply are even more expensive (in terms of transaction costs). 
Lai (2013) distinguishes latent transaction costs from actual transaction costs: when the latent 
transaction costs are prohibitively high, no transaction takes place, no actual transaction costs 
are incurred and thus the share of transaction sectors should be zero. Nevertheless, with latent 
transaction costs declining, transaction happen, transaction sectors and actual transaction costs 
do appear and increase. 
Thus a neat separation of production costs dependent on technology and transaction 
costs dependent on behaviour is not (always) tenable3. 
 
3“The transaction costs and transformation costs of buying (and selling) a house are, at the appropriate margins, 






Our study is based on the methodology of measuring transaction costs elaborated by 
Wallis and North (1986)4. They did the pioneer attempt at macroeconomic measurement of 
transaction costs for the US economy. Their “basic approach is to segregate economic 
activities and actors into those that are primarily associated with making market exchanges 
and those that are not. The sum of resources used by those associated with transacting make 
up our estimate of the transaction sector” (p. 97). The “transaction function” is an equivalent 
of the “transformation function” as costs are only incurred in either area when the expected 
benefits from doing do exceed the costs of doing so. Inputs into a transaction function are no 
different from ordinary inputs (land, labour, capital, entrepreneurship). “When we speak of 
transaction costs we mean the economic value of the inputs used in performing the transaction 
function (…). Transaction costs include the value of labour, land, capital and entrepreneurial 
skill used in making exchanges. We measure the size of the transaction sector by determining 
which labour, land and capital costs should be included in the transaction sector” (p. 97). 
Since part of the transaction costs are not observable (e.g. time spent looking for appropriate 
houses to buy or waiting for buyers to come by) Wallis and North introduce the measure of 
the “transaction services” not full transaction costs: transaction services are the observable 
part of transaction costs (e.g. services of lawyers and realtors; p. 99). Using (their) analogy 
with national income accounts, they only try to capture that part of transaction costs that flows 
through the market. 
Transaction costs inside firms are also identified by the function that particular 
employees (i.e. these are labour costs) perform. They “regard the firm as a bundle of 
contracts” whereby a hierarchy of contracts involves owners, managers, foremen, workers. At 
the top of the sequence (hierarchy)5 transaction costs involve processing and conveying 
information, at lower levels conveying information is complemented with monitoring the 
labour contract. In the simple stylized example they provide, Bill Gates (they use Henry Ford) 
first, purchases the firm’s output and the producers (sellers) are the people actually making 
the [products]; and secondly, he purchases the transaction services of the intermediate 
occupations in order to coordinate, enact, and monitor the exchange he makes with those who 
provide transformation services (p. 100). They are aware that “making detailed decisions on 
who does and who does not perform transaction functions in a given firm or industry is 
impossible short of an intimate and exhausting study of the process of transforming inputs 
into outputs in each industry. We have chosen a compromise method to get at transaction 
services within firms” (p. 100). They single out occupations that provide primarily transaction 
services to the firm and the residual (“by elimination”) are transformation services. “The 
wages of employees in these ‘transaction occupations’ constitute our measure of the 
transaction sector within firms” (p. 100). 
Wallis and North consider also a third category: intermediaries. Here, all of the 
resources, that is total value of the inputs used by the intermediaries, are included in the 
transaction sector and provide the measure of transaction costs. The problem in this case is to 
decide which firms/industries are properly classified as “transaction industries” 
(intermediaries). The authors include real estate and finance, banking and insurance, the legal 
 
4 For purposes of compatibility of results and availability of Polish data we have decided to update our 2005 
study of the application of the Wallis and North (Dollery and Leong) methodology. For somewhat different 
approaches see: Bischoff, 2002; Dalen, Vuuren, 2005.  




profession, wholesale and retail trade. With some hesitation they add “protective services” 
(police, guards, etc.) – unfortunately necessary for enforcing one’s property rights. 
All in all, according to Wallis and North, increases in transaction costs reduce net social 
welfare (p. 103). And yet, “none of our transaction services are unproductive. They all 
represent the resource costs of making exchanges which, on net, make the parties to those 
exchanges better off (even when transaction costs are included)” (p. 103-104). 
Coming to the empirical procedure of the measurement of macroeconomic transaction 
costs, it is worth, first, presenting Dollery’s and Leong’s (1998) division of economic 
activities distinguishing between the private and public transaction and non-transaction 
sectors of the economy (Table 1) – following Wallis’ and North’s (1986) study. 
 
Table 1. 
Transaction and non-transaction industries and services 
































Source: Dollery, Leong (1998), table 1, p. 209. 
 
In order to determine the transaction costs in the private production sector Wallis and 
North “estimated all of the resources used in the transaction industries” (p. 111). The 
researchers considered the following industries as transaction industries – Finance, Insurance 
and Real Estate (FIRE) and Wholesale and Retail Trade. The value of all the resources were 
taken directly from input/output tables or estimated basing on historical data. The resources 
estimates were then added up yielding transaction costs in private transaction industries. 
The transaction costs in private non-transaction industries were estimated using a more 
complex method. Producing mainly non-transaction goods and services, these industries – 
Agriculture, Construction, Mining, Manufacturing, Transport and Storage, and Services 
(business services; hotel and lodging places; other personal services, including private 
household; entertainment and recreation; medical and other health services; private education; 
organizations; other professional and related services; p. 148) – engage in exchange as well, 
i.e. are related with transaction costs. Wallis and North emphasized that since it is a very 
complex matter to isolate the resources devoted to transaction from those used in 
transformation (production) they concentrate “only on the labour costs associated with the 
transaction sector” (p. 104). In order to estimate transaction costs in this sector the researchers 
determined and defined “transaction” occupations – describing them as “type I” workers –and 
isolated them from non-transaction occupations. Wallis and North enumerated a variety of 
professions (pp. 126-127): 
a) “Managers, owners, and proprietors: including other managers, administrators, dealers (in 




b) Foremen: including foremen, inspectors, gaugers, weighers, postmasters, and conductors; 
c) Sales workers: including a variety of agents, shipping agents, purchasing agents, insurance 
and real estate agents; sales clerks, sales workers, newsboys, sales agents, and other sales 
workers; 
d) Clerical workers: bookkeepers, cashiers, secretaries, stenographers, office machine 
operators, telephone operators, typists, shipping clerks, receiving clerks, clerks, and other 
clerical workers; 
e) Professional workers: accountants, lawyers, judges, notaries, and personnel and labour 
relations workers; 
f) Protective workers: police, guards, watchmen, marshalls, sheriffs, detectives, and 
constables.” 
Next, Wallis and North found the share of “type I” workers in total employment for 
each industry and multiplied these shares by employee’s compensation across industries. By 
adding up these results the researchers got the transaction costs in private non-transaction 
industries. 
Wallis and North developed two estimation methods of transaction costs in the public 
transaction sector, whereas they laid greater emphasis on the first one. The first method 
involve dividing the public sector into two subsectors (as in Table 1). In the case of those 
government activities that were classified as transaction services, transaction costs were 
measured as government expenditures in these activities. In the case of government non-
transaction services Wallis and North proceeded as with private non-transaction industries, 
i.e. they calculated the share of “type I” workers in all government employment and 
multiplied these shares by employee compensation in non-transaction government services. 
The sum of these compensations constituted their estimate of transaction costs in the non-
transaction part of government. 
The second method Wallis and North employ to estimate the transaction costs in 
government “is less complete in its coverage, but avoids the problem of classifying defence 
expenditures and provides a minimum estimate of the transaction sector in government”6 (p. 
119). This method consists simply in treating the entire public sector as a non-transaction 
industry and proceeding as with the private non-transaction industries. 
Wallis and North divided all the transaction cost by GNP to relate transaction cost to a 
variable that could give some imagination of the size of transaction costs in the economy. 
 
3. Methodology of measurement of transaction costs in Poland and metadata 
 
We attempted to apply the theoretical framework described above to the Polish 
economy. Our aim was to cover a possibly long time span in our analysis. However, because 
of numerous problems with the availability and comparability of detailed and reliable data we 
had to limit our analysis to the period 1996-2014. At the time we wrote this paper comparable 
data for 2016 on employment and employee compensation were not available. Still, the 
transaction costs estimates are not fully comparable between most of the years and it is rather 
the trend than the precise values that is important to look at. We attempted to follow the 
approach of Wallis and North (1986) as closely as possible, mainly for the reason of 
 
6We only mention here that Wallis and North encountered some problems with classifying defense expenditures, 




comparability of results. However, in estimating the transaction costs in the public sector we 
chose the alternative method briefly presented by Wallis and North, since we wanted to avoid 
problems with data adjustment. We are aware of the fact, that the application of the second 
method leads to an underestimation of transaction costs, still we can determine their minimum 
level. 
We attempted to divide economic activity according to Wallis and North (1986), WN, 
and Dollery and Leong (1998), DL, as shown in Table 1. The current classification used by 
Poland’s CSO is the PKD 2007 (Polska Klasyfikacja Działalności – the Polish Classification 
of Activity), which divides socio-economic activity into sections, divisions, groups, classes 
and subclasses. PKD2007 is compatible with NACE Rev.2. up to the “class” level. The next 
level – subclass – regards the Polish economy only. Since we operate at the section and 
divisions levels our classification is fully compatible with NACE Rev.2. The previous 
versions of socio-economic activity classification were EKD, PKD 2001 and PKD 2004, 
which were elaborated on the basis of NACE Rev.1.The data we used in our study are based 
on all these classifications and we tried to adjust the data as much as possible. The most 
significant differences between the classifications regard PKD 2007 and PKD 2004 (Table 1A 
– Appendix). The classifications PKD 2007, 2004, 2001 and EKD seem more or less the same 
at the level of sections (although some sections are altered) and divisions, however at the 
more disaggregated level there are more significant differences. Hence, the years 1996-1999, 
2001-2002, 2004-2008 and 2010-2014 are not directly comparable. In general, since the data 
used to estimate the transaction costs in this study come from different sources and numerous 
adjustment were made in the case of all of them throughout the analysed period, the 
comparability of the estimations between individual years is somewhat limited. 
We adjusted the PKD classifications to the classifications according to the methodology 
of WN (Table 2). However, the adjustment needs some comments. Firstly, we had access to 
data (employment and global output) only at the section and some division level. According 
to the PKD classification we were able to isolate “Rail transport” only at the level of groups, 
from what results, that we had to treat the sector “Transport” as general, and assigned it 
entirely to the private production subsector. Secondly, we excluded the sections “Households 
hiring employees and producing for their own use” and “Organizations and exterritorial 
groups” because of lack of available data (however, these sections are not very significant, yet 
the exclusion leads to some underestimation of our transaction costs results). Thirdly, some 
sections, e.g. “Manufacturing”, according to the Polish classification contain some sort of 
services – however at a very high level of disaggregation – which makes is impossible to 
isolate and add to the sector of services and therefore adjust perfectly to the WN and DL 
classifications. However, since “Manufacturing” and “Services” both belong to the (private) 
production sector, it is not a significant problem. However, the same issue regards some 
sections from the private non-transaction sector – a few sections contain some kind of 
services, which makes a precise isolation of services in general very difficult. Fourthly, the 
section “Trade and repairs” (classified as private transaction sector) contains some economic 
activity that should be considered as public transaction services. However, we were not able 
to isolate this activity from our data. 
As we can see in Table 2, the shaded areas show that it was impossible to adjust fully 
the Polish classifications to the division of economic activity according to WN and DL. Since 
this problem appears mainly in the government sector, to solve this issue we decided to apply 
the second method of transaction costs estimation proposed by WN, i.e. treating the entire 




Our further analysis was determined by the availability of disaggregated data as well. 
What contributed to the limitation of our study is the lack of a more detailed division of the 
employed (which is the basis for the selection of “type I” workers) and employees 
compensation – only data divided into sections were at our disposal. This made a thorough 
adjustment of the classification of WN and our classification impossible. The data on 
employment (“type I” workers) and employment compensation were taken from a survey – Z-
12 – conducted every two years by Poland’s CSO what means that these data have all the 
deficiencies related to survey data. It is especially important to have in mind that the more the 
disaggregated data, the less exact the estimations, i.e. it may be that some very specific 
professions or specializations were not drawn every time the survey was conducted, what 
does not mean that there were no such professions/specializations in Poland that year. WN 
and DL estimated the transaction costs in non-transaction services analysing census data, 
which give a very thorough, detailed and precise picture of the number of “type I” workers in 
the economy. The authors used census data also because their very long period of analysis 
allowed for such an analysis. Mainly because of the problem of system change (from 
“centrally planned” to “market economy”) our period of analysis started only after the 
beginning of transition. Analysing census data in this case would limit our estimates to 2-3 
years and it is therefore we chose the Z-12 surveys. 
Throughout the analysed period, many changes occurred in the methodology applied in 
conducting the Z-12 survey. Among these changes were, among other things, such that in the 
period 1996-2001 the statistical office applied a different classification of professions and 
specializations from that in the next years, which varied from year to year (in the consecutive 
years). However, these changes don’t seem to influence the estimates considerably. A more 
significant effect is visible between the period before 2010 and starting from 2010. The 
classification applied in 2010 is very detailed and this allowed us to select more precisely 
“type I” workers. The result might be that the estimates for previous years may be somewhat 
overstated. Another issue is that the data in the Z-12 surveys until 2004 concern only the fully 
employed and after 2004 – both the fully employed and part-time employees. The last very 
important information about the Z-12 data, that may influence our results, is that the survey 
concerns only economic entities that employ more than 9 persons. 
 
Table 2.  
Comparison of classifications of economic activity a 














Agriculture Agriculture, forestry and fishing 
Agriculture, hunting and 
forestry, Fishing 
Construction Construction Construction 
Mining Mining and quarrying Mining and quarrying 
Manufacturing Manufacturing Manufacturing 
Transport / Storage Transportation and storage 
Transport, storage and 
communication 
Services 
Electricity, gas, steam and air 
conditioning supply; Water 
supply; sewerage, waste 
management and remediation 
activities; 
Accommodation and catering b; 
Education; Human health and 
social work activities; Arts, 
entertainment and recreation; 
Other service activities 
Electricity, gas and water 
supply; Hotels and 
restaurants; Education; 
Health and social work; 
Other community, social and 













(w/o insurance) Financial and insurance activities Financial intermediation 
Insurance 
Real estate 
Real estate activities; 
Professional, scientific and 
technical activities (in latter 
versions of PKD this was in real 
estate activities); Administrative 
and support service activities 
Real estate, renting and 
business activities 
Wholesale trade 















Education Education Education 
Health 
Human health and social work 
activities 
Health and social work 
Rail/Air transport 
- (is in Transportation and 
storage) 
- (is in Transportation and 
storage) 
Public utilities 
Electricity, gas, steam and air 
conditioning supply, Water 
supply; sewerage, waste 
management and remediation 
activities 
Electricity, gas and water 
supply 
Social welfare 
- (is in Human health and social 
work activities and Public 
administration and defence; 
compulsory social security) 
- (is in Health and social 
work and Public 
administration and defence; 
compulsory social security) 
Communications Information and communication 









 Public administration Public administration and 
defence; compulsory social 
security (should be in social 
welfare) 
Public administration and 
defence; compulsory social 





- (is in Transportation and 
storage) 
- (is in Transportation, 
storage and communication) 
Note: a The shaded areas show the incompleteness of adjustment. b Abbreviated label. 
Source: Dollery, Leong, 1998; PKD 2007, PKD 2004, PKD 2001 and EKD classifications (http://stat.gov.pl/; 
access: 25.01.2017). 
 
We did not have data on total employee compensation in the private and public sectors 
separately in individual sections. We had to derive the estimates in the following way. We 
took data on gross monthly wages (in October) from the Z-12 survey divided by sections, we 
multiplied them by 12 months and multiplied the results by data on employment in individual 
sections (at the end of the year) divided into the private and public sectors (from the GUS 
publications. Despite the shortcomings of such a solution it was the best way to obtain data 
that could serve for our calculations. 
Since the Z-12 survey was (is) conducted by the CSO approximately every 2 years, we 
estimated the macroeconomic transaction costs for the following years 1996, 1998, 1999, 
2001, 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012 and 2014. 
At the beginning of this section it was mentioned that we estimated transaction costs in 
government by applying the second method proposed by Wallis and North (1986). We 
applied this method because of the specificity of the data (the availability of data of different 
levels of disaggregation). The second method seemed more appropriate also because of better 




series. Moreover, it solves to a certain extent the problem of the incomplete adjustment of our 
classification to the classification of WN. 
GDP data was taken directly from Poland’s CSO website. These data are comparable, 
since the CSO adjusted the data series. 
It seems that we, however, modified the methodology applied by WN and DL. Their 
classification assigns individual economic activity as entirely private or public. In the case of 
Polish data in almost every section we could distinguish between activity belonging to the 
private or public sector. Therefore, we drew an explicit distinction between what is private 
and public. In this way, we included also some part of agriculture to the public sector (if there 
were people employed in agriculture belonging to the public sector). The same regarded the 
private sector – we included all private economic activity that could not be assigned to the 
WN sections to the section “services”. So even when in some years in the section defence, 
public administration there appeared some people employed in the private sector, we included 
them in the section services in the private sector of WN classification. 
 
4. Empirical results 
 
Turning to the results obtained by applying the WN methodology to estimate 
macroeconomic transaction costs in the Polish economy, firstly, we estimated the transaction 
costs in the private transaction sector. We calculated these costs by taking global output from 
the PKD sections identified as private transaction services according to Table 1 (see also 
Table 2) and dividing global output in these economic activities by current GDP. Adding up 
these shares of global output in GDP we obtained the estimates of transaction costs in the 
private transaction sector. 
The results are presented below in Table 3. Since 1996, stable and rapid growth was 
being observed in this sector, however the increase and pace of growth was different in 
individual sections. Transaction costs in the section of “Real estate and business activities” 
showed the greatest rise in absolute terms, whereas transaction costs in “Financial 
intermediation” had seen the most significant rise in relative terms. Most transaction costs in 
the private transaction sector were generated by “Trade and repair”. We can see that the 
increase in transaction costs petered out more or less in the middle of the analysed period and 





















































































































27.62 28.9 29.91 32.21 32.54 29.7 29.1 28.02 27.76 26.5 25.7 
Retail trade  
Note: a Data on global output in the private sector for the years 2010, 2012 and 2014 were not available. We 
extrapolated this data on the base of historical data. b Abbreviated name. 
Source: Own calculations based on data from Poland’s CSO Statistical Yearbooks of the Republic of Poland 
(1997-2016) and http://stat.gov.pl/ (access: 25.01.2017). 
 
Next, to estimate the transaction costs in the private non-transaction sector we followed 
the method by WN. Firstly, we isolated “type I” workers professions and specializations from 
the data on employment. Then, we summed “type I” workers over sections of economic 
activity classified as private non-transaction sector and divided this number by total 
employment in individual sections obtaining the shares of “type I” workers in every kind of 
private non-transaction economic activity. We multiplied these shares by employees 
compensation in the appropriate sections and at the end divided these results by current GDP. 
By adding up these shares in GDP we estimated the total transaction costs in the private non-
transaction sector. 
The results are presented in Table 4 (the tables 2A-4A in the Appendix show the steps 
of our calculations). Most transaction costs in this sector were generated by the sections 
“agriculture, forestry and fishing” and “manufacturing”, but also “transport, storage and 
























1.434 2.096 2.318 2.284 2.368 1.124 1.052 1.006 
0.907 1.132 1.137 
Fishing 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.004 0.002 






0.004 0.013 0.015 0.027 0.028 0.027 0.026 0.028 0.037 0.035 0.037 




and storage Transport, 
storage and 
communication 
0.128 0.316 0.516 0.740 0.758 0.656 0.627 0.687 
0.424 0.396 0.411 
Information and 
communication 






supply Electricity, gas 
and water 
supply 
0.004 0.012 0.016 0.022 0.022 0.040 0.039 0.057 






0.038 0.038 0.038 
Accommodation 
and catering a 
Hotels and 
restaurants 













0.001 0.003 0.056 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.005 0.008 0.007 0.000 0.000 
Education Education 0.017 0.043 0.064 0.055 0.054 0.060 0.055 0.080 0.096 0.084 0.123 
Human health 














0.154 0.186 0.300 0.247 0.245 0.356 0.215 0.302 
0.065 0.054 0.048 
Other service 
activities 
0.125 0.103 0.150 
Note: a Abbreviated name. 
Source: Own calculations based on data from tables 2A-4A in the Appendix. 
 
As described in the previous section, we applied the second method proposed by WN to 
estimate the transaction costs in government. We treated government entirely as non-




be emphasized is that by applying this method we underestimated transaction costs in 
government. The estimates determine the minimum of the size of transaction costs in the 
public sector. 
The results are presented in Table 5 (the tables 5A-7A in the Appendix show the steps 
of our calculations). As in private non-transaction industries in can be seen that the 
transaction cost generated in this sector were surely not as big as in private transaction 
industries. “Public administration and defence; compulsory social security” was the driver of 
transaction costs in government. 
 
Table 5. Transaction costs in government as percentage of GDP in Poland, 1996-2014 
PKD 2004, PKD 
2001, EKD 
1996 1998 1999 2001 2002 2004 2006 2008 PKD 2007 2010 2012 2014 
Agriculture, hunting 
and forestry 
0.05 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.04 0.03 
Agriculture, forestry and 
fishing 
0.03 0.03 0.03 
Fishing 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 Mining and quarrying 0.06 0.04 0.04 
Mining and quarrying 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.07 Manufacturing 0.06 0.04 0.04 
Manufacturing 
0.55 0.36 0.39 0.24 0.19 0.14 0.11 0.10 
Electricity, gas, steam, 
air conditioning supply 
0.14 0.07 0.06 
Electricity, gas and 
water supply 
0.18 0.20 0.25 0.23 0.23 0.19 0.19 0.19 
Water supply; sewerage, 
waste management and 
remediation activities 
0.07 0.07 0.08 
Construction 0.07 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 Construction 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Trade and repair a 
0.17 0.11 0.11 0.08 0.08 0.04 0.03 0.03 
Trade, repair of motor 
vehicles a 
0.02 0.01 0.01 
Hotels and restaurants 
0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 
Transportation and 
storage 
0.42 0.37 0.34 
Transport, storage and 
communication 
0.54 0.66 0.68 0.57 0.57 0.48 0.48 0.56 
Accommodation and 
catering a 
0.02 0.01 0.01 
Financial 
intermediation 
0.50 0.51 0.59 0.36 0.37 0.30 0.29 0.30 
Information and 
communication 
0.02 0.02 0.02 
Real estate, renting 
and business activities 
0.19 0.24 0.27 0.23 0.20 0.17 0.17 0.21 
Financial and insurance 
activities 





0.93 0.98 1.34 1.55 2.54 2.35 2.37 2.48 Real estate activities 0.09 0.06 0.07 
Education 
0.29 0.31 0.37 0.41 0.42 0.47 0.48 0.44 
Professional, scientific 
and technical activities 
0.08 0.07 0.09 
Health and social 
work 
0.32 0.29 0.32 0.28 0.29 0.20 0.24 0.25 
Administrative and 
support service activities 
0.01 0.01 0.02 
Other community, 
social and personal 
service activities 
0.15 0.16 0.20 0.19 0.20 0.16 0.16 0.17 
Public administration and 
defense; compulsory 
social security 
2.81 2.14 2.59 
                  Education 0.36 0.36 0.40 
                  
Human health and social 
work activities 
0.26 0.22 0.26 
                  
Arts, entertainment and 
recreation 
0.09 0.09 0.10 
                  Other service activities 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Note: a Abbreviated label. 




By adding up the transaction cost from tables 3-5 we obtained the transaction costs in 
Poland at the macroeconomic level. Figure 1 and Table 6 show the transaction costs from 
both the private and public sectors as well as the total transaction cost. In summary, we can 
assert the following: in the period of nineteen years, the ratio of total transaction costs in the 
Polish economy to GDP increased from 45.36% to 60.61%, however, the trend was not 
monotonic and the transaction costs reached its peak in 2002 (67.93%). We can even say that 
up till 2002 we could observe a steep increase in transaction costs and after 2002 they began 
to decrease gradually. A very similar trend is seen in the case of transaction industries of the 
private sector (a rapid rise from 38.69% in 1996 to 57.08% in 2002 and a, generally, slow 
decrease to 52.07% in 2014). The private transaction sectors contributed to the greatest extent 
to visible transaction costs in the economy (about 85%). Both non-transaction industries of 
the private sector and the entire government showed no considerable changes in transaction 
costs relative to GDP throughout the analysed period (oscillating between about 2.5% to 
5.5%) in comparison to the private transaction sector and amounted up to about one tenth of 
the transaction costs generated by private transaction industries. The share of these sectors 
(individually) in total transaction costs was more or less similar and about 6-9%. 
 
Table 6 
The transaction sector as a percentage of GDP in Poland, 1996-2014 
Category 1996 1998 1999 2001 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 
Transaction industries, 
private sector 
38.69 45.66 48.55 56.91 57.08 54.19 55.17 55.47 55.29 52.14 52.07 
Non-transaction industries, 
private sector 
2.59 4.45 5.44 5.56 5.56 4.55 4.19 4.48 4.39 4.62 4.91 
Government 4.07 4.05 4.77 4.35 5.28 4.65 4.67 4.86 4.08 3.17 3.64 
Total trans action costs 45.36 54.16 58.76 66.81 67.93 63.39 64.03 64.81 63.76 59.92 60.61 
Source: Own calculations based on data from tables 3-5. 
 
Figure 1 
The transaction sector as a percentage of GDP in Poland, 1996-2014 
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5. Comparison with other research 
 
Apart from the study of Wallis and North (1986), a few papers replicating their research 
on macroeconomic transaction costs have appeared to date. For better visualization we 
provided the graphical results of selected studies (Figure 2). Dollery and Leong have 
explicitly asked the questions (1998, p. 208) that we tried to address, among others, and with 
appropriate modifications in our study: 
a) Can the findings of Wallis and North be replicated in a country at a middle level of 
development / in transition (the beginning of our period of analysis)? To what extent are 
the results of Wallis and North a unique artefact of the US economy? 
b) Can the technique developed by Wallis and North be applied in a different institutional 
milieu using alternative data sources? 
c) Do the results shed some light on the nature of economic development of the country? 
In this paper, we extend the applications of Wallis-North investigation. While Dollery 
and Leong (1998) found essential similarity for two developed capitalist national economies, 
Dagnino-Pastore and Farina (1999) added significant details for less developed capitalist 
national economies, Sulejewicz and Graca (2005) and the present text extend, with 
appropriate modifications the conclusions for the post-socialist countries7. Definitions have 
been standardized and are generally accepted among the group of researchers working in this 

















7 The calculations adapted to NACE Nomenclature statistique des Activités Economiques dans la Communauté 
Européenne.  
8 The works referred to include: Chobanov, Egbert, 2007; Da, 2010; Miao, Chen, 2002, [China Measuring of 
Transaction Costs and Economy Growth, “Statistical Research”, No. 8, pp. 14-21] quoted in: Zhengchao, Wang, 





Comparison of results of selected studies on macroeconomic transaction costs – 
percentage of GDP a 
 
Note: a With the exception of the study of Wallis and North (1986) – % of GNP, Ghertman (1998) – % of GNP 
and Popov and Veretennikova (2015) – % of GRP in the case of the Middle Urals. 
Source: Table 6 – AS&PGG (2017); Wallis, North, 1986, Table 3.13, p. 121 – W&N (1988), A, and W&N 
(1988), B; Dollery, Leong, 1998, Table 7, p. 220, Table 8, p. 222, Table 9, p. 223 – D&L (1998); Chobanov, 
Egbert, 2007, Table 2, p. 692 – C&E (2007); Dagnino-Pastore, Farina, 1999, Table 6, p. 8 – D-P&F (1999); Da, 
2010, Table 2, pp. 285-286 – D (2010); Ghertman, 1998, Appendix I, p. 20 – G (1998), F, G (1998), G, G 
(1998), J and G (1998), U; Popov, Veretennikova, 2015, Figure 4, p. 37 – P&V (2015), R and P&V (2015), U. 
 
Wallis and North’s (1986) estimates show the total transaction costs rising from 26% in 
1870 to almost 55% in 1970 (Table 3.13, p. 121).What is not shown in Figure 1 is that share 
of national income or GNP going to “type I” workers in non-transaction industries (private 
sector) rose from 1.4% in 1870 to 10% in 1970 (p. 109), the resources used in trade and FIRE 
(Finance, Insurance and Real Estate) increased from about 20% in 1870 to slightly over 30% 
(p. 112-113). The share of transaction costs generated in the public sector rose from 3.67% or 
1.71% in 1870, depending on the method applied, to 13.9% or nearly 6% in 1970. The 
authors’ argument is that there are three important reasons for the rise in TCs over the century 
they studied (pp. 122-123): 
1) The development of a market economy means the spread of impersonal exchange, the 
individuals involved in dealing in anonymous markets know less and less about the 





























































































































AS&PGG (2017) W&N (1988), A W&N (1988), B
D&L (1998) C&E (2007) D-P&F (1999)
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executing contracts become more significant with the expansion of the market and growing 
organization of the economy. 
2) Technological change and the ever more pronounced economies of scale that have 
contributed to capital intensive production techniques and the development of large 
corporations “placed a premium on the coordination of inputs and outputs and on 
monitoring the numerous contracts involved in production and distribution”. 
3) “The declining costs of using the political system to restructure property rights (…) which 
replaced the decision-making ability by executive departments of the government (…) 
[and] imposed transaction costs on the rest of the economy”. 
The evolution of the transaction costs in Australia also presents a – generally – rising 
trend: total transaction sector as a percentage of GDP increased from 32% in 1911 to 59.5% 
in 1991 (Dollery, Leong, 1998, Table 9, p. 223). As component parts of the total: the private 
transaction sector rose from 28.3% in 1911 to 49.4% in 1991, and the public sector 
contribution increased from about 4% in 1911 to over 10% in 1991 (Table 7, p. 220, Table 8, 
p. 222).  The share inside the ownership sectors show that, for the private sector, the bulk of 
transaction costs arose in private transaction industries: from 26% in 1911 to nearly 45% of 
GDP in 1991 (i.e. they constituted more than 90%; Table 7, p. 220). In more detail: “trade 
activities”’ stabilized around 20% while significant growth was observed for the “finance” 
industries which rose to prominence, from mere 2% to 20% at the end of the period (Table 3, 
p. 215). 
For the public sector, transaction services grew from 3.2% to 6.6% (against the 
contribution of non-transaction services growing from 0.8% to 3.5%; i.e. they constituted 
around 2/3; p. 219 and Table 6, p. 218). Thus public sector employees in non-transaction 
sectors contributed considerably more, relatively speaking, than equivalent private sector 
services. This is understandable – the state’s role in a developed market economy is precisely 
this: provision of services facilitating exchange. While the public transaction services more 
than doubled in the period of eight decades they still represent only 1/5 of the private 
transaction services at the end of the period (against 12% in 1911; p. 215 and 218). 
Nevertheless, the relative increase of the role of the state in protecting and facilitating market 
exchange is unambiguous. 
For the overlapping years, the magnitude of American and Australian transaction 
services, i.e. observable and measurable part of the transaction costs passing through the 
market, was generally similar, with the American ratios being from 3 to 15 percentage points 
higher. The magnitude of public sector transaction activities was also higher in the US, both 
absolutely and relatively, than in Australia. The ratio in 1970 was almost 14% of GDP 
(Wallis, North, 1986, Table 3.11, p. 118), whereas the Australian one was somewhat above 
6.5% (Dollery, Leong, 1998, Table 6, p. 218) and this represented, in relation to the total, 
more than 25% (an increase from below 14%). The American State was visibly deeply 
involved in protecting property rights and safeguarding market exchange. The trend towards 
its faster growth is unambiguous. 
Dagnino-Pastore and Farina (1999), who analysed the transaction sector in Argentina in 
the years 1930-1990 came to similar results – overall, transaction costs in the Argentinian 
economy rose, with periods of slight decrease from 24.9% of GDP in 1930 to 34.6% in 1990 
(Table 6, p. 8). However, the authors stated, that the transaction costs in Argentina “do not 
show a sustained growth trend, but rather stagnation in two successive plateaus, with an 
intermediate upward step” and that “[t]he first impression is that until 1991 the Argentine 




transaction cost went to private transaction industries, which – however – did not reveal any 
specific trend and oscillated between over 16% to 25% of GDP (Table 6, p. 8) throughout the 
analysed period. The rise in total transaction cost was the effect of an increase in transaction 
costs generated in government. Among the transaction industries most transaction costs came 
from Commerce rather than from FIRE. Compared to all the other estimates of transaction 
costs (Figure 2) transaction costs in the Argentinian economy were the lowest. Dagnino-
Pastore and Farina came to the conclusion that “[t]he gap [between the ratios of transaction 
costs to GDP between Argentina and other countries] widened in absolute (0.13 to 0.22) and 
in relative (69 to 61%) terms. Of the TC components, TC of transaction industries is the one 
with a share nearest to that of developed countries; the other extreme are remuneration of 
Type I employees” (p. 20). 
Chobanov and Egbert (2007) carried out a study on the transaction costs in Bulgaria 
within the period 1997-2003. Their results are the most similar ones to those obtained in our 
study, which can be explained by the fact that both economies – the Bulgarian as well as the 
Polish one – are post-socialist countries, that experienced the transformation from a centrally-
planned to a market-based economy that had started at the beginning of the 1990s of the 20th  
century. Total transaction costs in Bulgaria saw a rapid rise throughout the analysed period, 
starting from 37.4% of GDP in 1997 and reaching 52.7% of GDP in 2003 (Table 2, p. 692). 
As in the Polish economy, transaction costs in Bulgaria rose very fast at the beginning, 
coming to a halt (?) around 2002. The increase in total transaction costs was mostly due to the 
rise in transaction costs in transaction industries, which rose from 28.8% of GDP in 1997 to 
36.1% of GDP in 2003 (Table 2, p. 692). This sector generated most of total transaction costs 
as well. Chobanov and Egbert stated that this increase “can be explained by the liberalization 
of the Bulgarian economy” (p. 692). Transaction costs in non-transaction industries 
constituted a much less part of total transaction costs, however, these cost rose considerably in 
relative terms – with the exception of “Agriculture, hunting and forestry” – being the effect of 
the privatization of most enterprises in this sector (p. 693). “[T]he efforts the government 
spent on improving state administration in the transition period” were the main explanation of 
the increase in government transaction services – from 3.7% of GDP in 1997 to 9.6% of GDP 
in 2003 (p. 693).Only the sector of non-transaction services remained stable at about 4% of 
GDP throughout the analysed period (Table 6, p. 694). 
The study of Da (2010) on the measurement of transaction costs in China revealed that 
the proportion of transaction costs in GDP rose from 0.204% in 1978 to roughly 0.3% in 
2007, which – according to the author – was a remarkable increase. Transaction cost were the 
highest in the tertiary industry, whereas the transaction sectors in the primary and second 
industries showed a low and diminishing relation to GDP. Da concludes, among other things, 
that “with China's economic growth, China's transaction sectors are embracing an ascending 
transaction costs, but there is still a big gap between China and developed countries in 
transaction service level” (p. 297), which can also be seen in Figure 2, if we compare the level 
of transaction costs in China with e.g. those in the US or Australia. 
In an earlier study, Ghertman (1998) calculated transaction costs in France, Germany, 
Japan and the US between 1960 and 1990, replicating the method of Wallis and North (1986). 
The study showed that France has seen the greatest increase in transaction costs in this period, 
both in absolute as in relative terms (from 33.28% in 1962 to 63.86% in 1990, as a share in 
GNP). On the other hand, the US started with the highest level of transaction costs relative to 
GNP in 1960 (55.34%), which remained high throughout the analysed period, although the 
rise was not so considerable (62.76% in 1990). Germany recorded the lowest transaction costs 




things, that despite of the fact that the analysed countries had experienced convergence of per 
capita income, institutional differences remained. 
The study of Popov and Veretennikova (2015) is another example of the application of 
Wallis’ and North’s methodology to calculate transaction costs from a macroeconomic 
perspective. The authors estimate transaction costs in the Middle Urals (Russia) for the period 
2005-2009, which increased from 26.8 to 29.8 (% of GRP). The rise was not monotonic and 
the level was clearly lower from that recorded in other countries (see Figure 2). The authors 
explain the latter by the fact that the analysed region is highly industrialized, thus the 
transformation sector is of much greater importance compared to the economy as a whole. A 
second explanation is that Popov and Veretennikova did not take into account transaction 
costs within firms, which would probably increase their estimates by about 4 to 14%. The 
authors present the estimates of transaction costs in Russia as well (citing a not published 
study by Erznkyan, 2012), although for a different period – 2001-2007. It is shown that 
transaction cost in Russia increased monotonically from 38.1 to 50, as a percentage in GDP. 
Against these trends, what can we say about the Polish nineteen-year period? The 
synthesizing graph (Figure 2) shows several economies in historical perspective. First, as we 
can see, all the results show a similar pattern – transaction costs have generally exhibited a 
rising trend (with a few sub-periods of some decrease) throughout the analysed periods in 
every country. Second, the dramatic rise of transaction costs in Poland in the middle of 
transition from “real socialism” to capitalism clearly stands out. The steepness of the curve 
demonstrates that profound changes have been occurring in this society. Third, relatively 
speaking, in terms of GDP ratio, the Polish State contributed merely ½ of the Australian level 
of public transaction services and about 1/3 of the American level. The privatization drive has 
deprived the State of much of the productive assets (and concomitant non-transaction 
activities). 
One additional interpretation is that the popular sentiment, fuelled by the media9, about 
the abrupt (at the turn of the decades of 1980s/1990s) and dramatic rise in business related 
criminal activities, fraud and large scale corruption, emergence of organized crime, etc., has 
found scientific confirmation. Ever growing reliance on private transactions, with massive 
ownership redefinition, wealth and income redistribution, emergence of new institutional 
setups for a large number of economic and social activities and is likely to be costly in terms 
of collective and individual errors, need for erecting safeguards against cheating10, 
establishment and enforcement of law. 
One notes “zigzags” in some of the parameters. These indicate perhaps some 
unreliability of the estimates, or drawback in the concept as defined. The level of transaction 
costs reveals and demonstrates the general degree of confidence in the economic organization, 
the reliability market economy in satisfying expectations of business security. In other words, 
they point to an element of culture that is unlikely to change rapidly. Can it vary periodically 
or oscillate around an implicit level in tune with historic, political events? One would ascribe 




9And, to be sure, backed up by alarming social statistics. 
10In the theoretical sense used in new institutional economics. Anecdotal evidence seems to validate “high TC” 
nature of the Polish economy. An alternative formulation is “low trust’ society/economy, and a number of 




6. Discussion of selected theoretical points 
 
As signalled above, the macroeconomic concept of transaction costs originated in the 
work of Douglass North. At least four works lay the foundations, reflecting the Authors 
changing argumentation: 
1) North D. C., 1984, Government and the Cost of Exchange in History, “The Journal of 
Economic History”, Vol. 44, No. 2, pp. 255-264. 
2) Wallis J., North D., 1986, Measuring the transaction sector in the American economy, 
1870–1970, in: S. Engerman, R. Gallman, eds., “Long Term Factors in American 
Economic Growth”, Chicago, Chicago University Press, pp. 95–162. 
3) Wallis J., North D., 1988, Should transaction costs be subtracted from gross national 
product, “The Journal of Economic History”, Vol. 48, No. 3, pp. 651–654. 
4) North D. C., Wallis J., 1994, Integrating institutional change and technical change in 
economic history: A transaction cost approach, “Journal of Institutional and Theoretical 
Economics”, Vol. 150, No. 4, pp. 609-624. 
The calculations accomplished in Wallis and North (1986) fairly consistently confirmed 
by all other investigations make one concur with the empirical conclusion of Dollery and 
Leong (1998, p. 228) „Despite some variation transaction costs appear to exhibit an 
inexorably rising trend”. On account of the research performed and own investigations, one 
may even be tempted to formulate a “law of increasing transaction costs in market 
economies”. It seems that Douglass North is inclined to follow classical political economy in 
this instance and specify the “law” in terms of tendencies and countertendencies. He specifies 
the conflicting arguments as “reasons” for the rise in transactions costs (1986) and 
“tendencies counteracting” the rise (1984). 
On the one hand (1986): 
(1) The development of a market economy means the spread of impersonal exchange, the 
individuals involved in dealing in anonymous markets know less and less about the 
persons from whom they buy their products. Therefore, the costs of specifying and 
executing contracts become more significant with the expansion of the market and 
growing urbanization in the economy. 
(2) Technological change and the ever more pronounced economies of scale that have 
contributed to capital intensive production techniques and the development of large 
corporations “placed a premium on the coordination of inputs and outputs and on 
monitoring the numerous contracts involved in production and distribution”. 
(3) “The declining costs of using the political system to restructure property rights via 
development of commissions, which replaced the decision-making unit of entire 
legislatures and the development of the rule-making ability by executive departments of 
the government (…). This type of government growth imposed transaction costs on the 
rest of the economy”. 
But, on the other hand (1984): 
(1) First, the innovation of organizational forms that reduce the costs of transacting. This is 
the focus of Williamson's study of the corporation (1981) and much of the economists 
transaction cost literature. 
(2) The second is the substitution of capital for labour to reduce the opportunity for shirking, 




(3) Finally, the role of government has not been simply a gigantic mechanism for income 
redistribution raising the costs of transacting. As the foregoing has attempted to argue, 
the role of government as an impersonal, third party to specify and enforce contracts has 
been an essential part of the story. 
Thus North and Wallis invoke several mechanisms, both more widely economic and 
more narrowly institutional to account for the prima facie surprising fact of rising costs of 
market functioning. Changes in technology, economies of scale, behavioural consequences of 
capital-labour substitution, innovation of organizational forms, impersonality of exchange, 
restructuring of property rights via political systems, specification and public enforcement of 
contracts, among others, provide for somewhat complex results and contradictory 
interpretations on the evolution of private and public transaction activities. Firstly, “[t]he 
proportion of society's resources devoted to exchange has been increasing: this is not 
surprising.” (North, 1984). And yet, when looking at (Australian) data, „[t]he figures in 
column 3 [top line in fig. F – PGG, AS] do not measure total transaction costs; instead they 
measure that observable part of transaction costs flowing through the market process, in terms 
of marketed services, known as transaction services. That these had increased from roughly a 
third of national income in 1911 to well over 59 percent in 1991 is indeed surprising" 
(Dollery, Leong, 1998). 
“Economists and economic historians have described fundamental structural changes in 
the American economy in the past century. (...) Our interpretation of the role of transaction 
costs is consistent with these structural shifts, but leads to a different interpretation of the 
American economy than has been traditionally associated with this evidence” (Wallis, North, 
1986, p. 120). After all, „(…) gains from specialization and the division of labour are not a 
free lunch” (Wallis, North, 1986, p. 95). This fundamental point was disputed as early as the 
publication itself – the commentary of Lance Davis focussed on four empirical points: 
1) classification into transaction and non-transaction sector is controversial (various relevant 
definitions are possible); 
2) statistical data compiled in the text had been collected for different purposes; 
3) individual activities (in present occupation) can be subsumed either as transaction or non-
transaction or both; 
4) only registered market transactions enter calculation (informal and household sector has 
been ignored). 
But what is more important, the macroeconomic concept of transaction costs is riddled 
with theoretical ambiguities. While the verbal distinction between transaction services 
(sectors) and transaction costs is affirmed, in the reasoning provided, transaction services 
(sectors) are treated as logically equivalent to transaction costs. "Note that those individuals 
are acting rationally, but the result is to increase transaction costs and thereby reduce net 
social welfare” (North, 1984). „Because we focus on transaction services rather than 
transaction costs, our measure should not be interpreted as an estimate of the level of 
transaction costs within the economy, any more than GNP numbers should be taken as a 
direct measure of well-being. […] the attempt to capture the benefits of specialization and 
division of labor has changed the organization of economic activity in the United States over 
the last century. Remember that none of our transaction services are unproductive. They all 
represent the resource costs of making exchanges which, on net, made the parties to those 
exchanges better off (even when transaction costs are included)” (Wallis, North, 1986, p. 
104). “The fact that growth of the transaction sector is due primarily to an expansion of 
intermediate transaction services belies a common but erroneous perception among 




Or, as William Parker put it, they are »waste - sheer, reckless, glorious spendthrift waste«” 
(Wallis, North, 1988, p. 654). 
Let us note that in one paper it seems to be clear that "[t]he numbers suggest that the 
growth of the transaction sector may be a drag on economic growth, that firms incur 
increasing transaction costs to manage their ever growing size and complexity, and that these 
costs may gradually erode the productivity gains associated with technological change and 
economies of scale” (North, Wallis, 1994, pp. 609-10). Therefore, “[w]e believe that there is a 
plausible, indeed strong, case to be made for the argument that institutional change and 
falling transaction costs were a significant source of economic growth over the last two 
centuries.” (North, Wallis, 1994, p. 622). And they add, significantly, that the exact 
magnitude of such a contribution remains to be measured. 
The authors emphasize that technical innovation can lead as easily to reductions in 
transaction costs as it can to reductions in transformation costs. “Likewise institutional 
change may lead to reductions in either transaction or transformation costs. There is not, and 
should not be, a one to one identification between institutions and transaction costs or 
between techniques and transformation costs. By assuming an implausibly strong link 
between institutions and transaction costs, economists have been able to further assume 
that transaction costs need not be measured.”  And they add an even more fundamental 
methodological proviso: “Under that assumption, theories that propose an important role for 
institutional change in explaining the development of economies must necessarily be content 
with making assertions that can rarely be confirmed or falsified, since the economic variable 
they rely on, transaction costs, is unobservable” (North, Wallis, 1994, p. 622). 
And further, demand theories built on this assumption are forced to conclude that the 
development of institutional structures embodied in a growing transaction sector has been a 
constraint on the rate of economic growth rather than an independent source of growth 
(ibidem). Thus North and Wallis (1994) acknowledge the methodological weaknesses when 
they assert that perhaps institutional change has not played an independent role in 
creating growth, perhaps transaction costs have been rising in the aggregate and per 
exchange. “But we cannot determine whether the assumption is accurate if we use a 
theoretical framework that precludes, by design, the possibility that the assumption is wrong. 
Now we are in a position to at least challenge the assumption that transaction costs rise 
because of the need to accommodate technical change. In heuristic terms, if the demand for 
transaction inputs was sufficiently elastic, in the way that the demand for cheap cotton textiles 
or Model T's was elastic, then a significant expansion in the size of the transaction sector 
could have been induced by a reduction in transaction costs. The growth of the transaction 
sector may not have been caused by an increase in the derived demand for transaction 
services, but by a shift in the supply curve of those services” (North, Wallis, 1994, pp. 622-
623). They see both alternatives as consistent with the evidence presented in their earlier work 
and conclude that there was, as yet, little ground to choose between the two. And they 
surmise: “the predisposition to favor the derived demand explanation is nothing more than 
that, a predisposition” (North, Wallis, 1994, p. 623). 
Lai (2013) labels the contradictory interpretations “the Wallis North paradox in 
transaction cost measurement”: “Without exception, all of these measurements concluded that 
the transaction sectors as a proxy of transaction costs keep growing over time along with the 
economic development, implying that the more developed an economy is, the higher their 
transaction costs would be. (...) This is the Wallis–North paradox” (Lai, 2013, p. 1445). He 
introduces a distinction between Wallis and North’s actual transaction costs that already 




transaction costs that determine what transactions can happen and how big the transaction 
sectors can be. (…) The latent transaction costs cannot be measured directly since they exist 
latently” (ibidem). “When the latent transaction costs were prohibitively high, no transaction 
and actual transaction costs would happen and thus the share of transaction sectors should be 
zero; nevertheless, with latent transaction costs declining, transaction sectors and actual 
transaction costs will increase. Therefore, a higher share of transaction sectors in an economy 
reveals that the economy actually has a lower level of (latent) transaction costs. The Wallis–
North approach is still workable for the transaction cost measurement but with an inverted 
interpretation. (...) Of course, this note left latent transaction costs unexplained” (ibidem). 
One cannot however be satisfied with the solution. As a counter-example let us remind 
ourselves of one of many firearms incidents in the United States. In February 2018 the 
shooting at Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School in Parkland, Florida left 17 pupils dead 
and 17 injured. After the incident, 14 state legislators introduced bills to arm school staffs and 
resumed concealed weapons (usually hand guns) training for teachers. So far financing 
training and/or weapon purchase was not to be allowed from federal funds. These would be  
tantamount to actual transaction costs of secondary education in the state concerned. 
However, to make Lai’s account of Wallis and North work, one should assume that latent 
transaction costs (in the relevant sphere) in US high schools are even higher. 
Generally, the rise of the transaction sector reflects a shift of employment in the primary 
and secondary sector to employment in the tertiary sector. The transaction sector of an 
economy is exactly that part the tertiary sector which dynamically grows. Structural change 
in transaction sector where productivity is the highest (Loechel, 1995; Bischoff, 2002). A 
“growing transaction sector indicates an increasing division of labour, a deeper 
specialisation and a generally more intensive exchange within the economy which 
correlates with expanding markets. On the other hand, it can be argued that an expanding 
transaction sector is indicative of increasing inefficiencies and is due to a lack of trust in a 
(post-socialist) society” (Sulejewicz, Graca, 2005, also quoted in Chobanov, Egbert, 2007). 
Finally, let us note that Dollery and Leong (1998) evoked two pieces of research on 
the structures of the respective economies: Dowie (1970) studied trends in the “services 
sector” in Australia from 1890 to 1965 drawing on a similar study of Fuchs (1969) for the US 
economy. What is somewhat embarrassing is the statement that “Dowie’s definition of the 
services sector seems comparable to the Wallis and North definition of transaction industries 
(“finance”, “trade”) added to non-transaction industries (community and personal services) 
and most of the public transaction services (public administration, defence)” (Dollery, Leong, 
p. 226). The source of our uneasiness is the fact that in the analyses of structural change in the 
capitalist economies, the economists of the 1960s were attempting to ascertain “ordinary”, 
empirically measurable elements of productive structures of market economies. The closeness 
of the definition to the ones provided by visibly critical of neoclassical models new 
institutional economics cannot but raise the question so what is new in the “new economics”? 
The tentative conclusion is that the concept of “transaction costs” loses its critical edge when 
is being used in a macroeconomic fashion and transforms itself into an “ordinary” element of 
the division of labour. Some types of labour are transaction activities while others are not, but 
both enter into standard accounting schemes. To be sure, we are only talking of the visible, 
measurable, activities passing through markets, i.e. “transaction services”. The (part of?) 
“true” transaction costs remain invisible: something that Wallis and North describe for 
example as waiting for customers, searching for clients (expenditure of time). But surely, this 
is not what was initially implied by the microeconomic concept: contingent cost related with 




Sales costs are sales costs, they may be superfluous from the point of view of customers (faux 
frais du capitalisme as described by Karl Marx11) but calling them transaction costs may add 
little to their theoretical status. 
 
7. Some further hypotheses 
 
The initial identification by North and Wallis of macroeconomic (empirical, historical, 
actual, incurred) transaction costs has led to ambiguities and a paradox: 
(1) If cost (input) interpretation is retained: the market economies, and especially (post-
socialist) economies undergoing market transformation, i.e. development of market 
democracies, are increasingly inefficient, (gloriously) wasteful. (Some are less 
wasteful: Japan or Germany economizing on defence spending and governance; others 
more: France, the US (Ghertman, 1998).) 
(2) If cost (input) interpretation is retained, and neoclassical apparatus is adduced (technical 
change, firm production functions, shifts of supply curve, derived demand) one may have 
an alternative interpretation in that expansion in the size of the transaction sector could 
have been induced by a reduction in transaction costs. North and Wallis: „Both 
alternatives are consistent with the evidence presented in our earlier paper and there is, as 
yet, little ground to choose between the two. But the predisposition to favor the derived 
demand explanation is nothing more than that, a predisposition.” 
(3) If division of labour and structural change is retained as interpretation of increasing 
transaction sectors one reportedly, need worry only if these do not increase sufficiently 
(Russia, Argentina). The study of transaction sectors boils down to largely empirical 
ascertainment of the rise of „modern” „market” services, a phenomenon which is 
expected and apparently encouraged. 
(4) Yet, in cases of post-socialist transition unprecedented speed of the rise in transaction 
sectors „clashes” with conventional positive appraisal of marketisation of social 
relations and invites cost interpretation: the growing impersonal character of transactions 
in the condition of low trust in society is suggestive of increasing inefficiencies. 
Thus one is forced to accept complex and uncertain causality of increasing index of 
transaction activities as a percentage of the gross national output in developed capitalism. One 
wonders if one can have it both ways, i.e. conceiving: 
(1) lowering transaction costs as removal of a barrier to growth and a sign of development 
and 
(2) increasing transaction costs as revealing structural change leading to further growth and a 
sign of development. 
Well, yes, if one thinks about the problem as the development of capitalist markets 
which are: 
• wasteful (one needs mention only financialisation, rent seeking on a formidable scale); 
• inegalitarian (wealth protection required for the rich); 
• (since late 19th century) increasingly corporation-driven, i.e. by ever larger institutional 
devices “optimized” for rent seeking; 
 




• assisted by growing (indebted) state through the provision of public goods and services 
whereby it generates massive (land) rents (inverted Henry George hypothesis / state 
capture). 
If one accepts these characteristics, then in order to theorize “late capitalist” 
development 
• we do not need a transhistorical concept of „transaction cost” any longer; 
• we can do without a concept that is not scalable (in the sense of Williamson’s “pragmatic 
methodology” of new institutional economics) from the theory of the firm to the theory of 
development (social and economic change), i.e. from “micro” to “macro”; 
• we are emboldened to draw this conclusion by the last books of Douglass North where 
the concept of „transaction costs” as a factor explaining long term growth and 
development is superfluous; it does not appear in the index of either D. C. North, J. J. 
Wallis, B. R. Weingast, Violence and Social Orders. A Conceptual Framework for 
Interpreting Recorded Human History, CUP 2009 or two subsequent compendia of 
empirical applications, let alone in the explanatory schemes contained there-in. 
While adding a philosophical commentary at the end of the paper is somewhat risky, 
one is led to hypothesise that identification and measurement of macroeconomic transaction 
costs (viewed as transaction services) appears to be a degenerated scientific research 
programme (Imre Lakatos). Methodologically, one would wish for theoretically progressive 
problem shift: a move to new theories which enable one to (e.g.) predict more than a 
predecessor theory allowed. A problem shift is empirically progressive if in addition to 
predicting new observable evidence, actual observation does indeed confirm this new 
prediction. If, on the other hand, a programme fails to display this characteristic, it is no 
longer progressive but has become "degenerating". Lakatos himself became rather cautious 
(after serious criticism) and refrained from advocating elimination of the whole scientific 
research programmes because, even on his account, it was still rational to stick to a 
degenerating programme in the hope that it would make a comeback (Lakatos, 1971). Yet, the 
authors of the original interpretation themselves have not returned to the topic since 1995 
despite obvious utility of an update and own suggestions to this effect (J. J. Wallis’ research 
plans on his web site had a brief mention of the topic in early 21st century, but it has since 
disappeared). While one is left to ponder whether the problem shift to Violence and social 
orders as an explanation of (capitalist) development is a progressive one in itself, the 





The major reasons for the increase in transaction services proposed by North and Wallis 
also seem reasonable for the Polish economy. The expansion of the market with its 
impersonal exchange, transformation of the nature of a great number of social relationships 
into moneyed ties and contractual arrangements could not but have increased the costs of 
protecting property rights. Therefore, the costs of specifying and executing contracts become 
more significant with the expansion of the Polish market. It is difficult to evaluate the second 




have strengthened the tendency identified by Wallis and North. Finally, the interpretation of 
the role of the state in both economies needs deeper analysis. 
In addressing the questions posed by Dollery and Leong we are lead to believe that 
some of their conclusions have safely been repeated in this study: empirical results for the 
American economy are roughly replicated also by a much poorer, less industrialized economy 
in transition (the 1990s/2000s); secondly, the methodology for measuring the “visible” 
transaction services developed by Wallis and North, can after suitable modifications be 
applied in an Eastern European context. The national accounting system in Poland is 
comprehensive enough to allow fairly detailed comparative studies. Our expectations on the 
possibility of verification of this thesis in several other Eastern European countries so as to be 
able to provide a more thorough comparative study of economic transition of the 1990s and 
2000s have only partially been fulfilled. Also as for the nature of economic development, we 
still hesitate to pronounce any judgment, however. The period of two decades (or shorter) 
seems too short, some variations in specific parameters require further investigation 
(especially the stagnation of these costs in Poland after 2002). We have no data on the 
previous years and it is hardly possible to make hypotheses regarding the beginning of the 
market transition, let alone the period of “real socialism”. We do not know whether the 
increase is a continuation of the former trend – and if yes, since when. While we concur with 
continuous development of new institutional economics12 we think that this particular effort 
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Comparison of Polish classifications of economic activity 
PKD 2007, abbreviated label * PKD 2004, PKD 2001 and EKD, abbreviated name * 
Agriculture, forestry and fishing Agriculture, hunting and forestry 
 Fishing 
Mining and quarrying Mining and quarrying 
Manufacturing Manufacturing 
Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply Electricity, gas and water supply 
Water supply; sewerage, waste management and 
remediation activities  
Construction Construction 
Trade, repair of motor vehicles * Trade and repair * 
Transportation and storage Hotels and restaurants 
Accommodation and catering * Transport, storage and communication 
Information and communication  
Financial and insurance activities Financial intermediation 
Real estate activities Real estate, renting and business activities 
Professional, scientific and technical activities  
Administrative and support service activities  
Public administration and defence; compulsory 
social security 
Public administration and defence; compulsory social 
security 
Education Education 
Human health and social work activities Health and social work 
Arts, entertainment and recreation  
Other service activities Other community, social and personal service activities 
Households hiring employers and producing for their 
own use Households hiring employers 
Organizations and exterritorial teams Organizations and exterritorial teams 





Table 2A. Shares of “type I” workers in total employment in individual economic 





































































0.226 0.288 0.265 0.224 0.283 0.248 0.229 0.207 
0.182 0.210 0.212 




























0.217 0.366 0.414 0.481 0.465 0.457 0.431 0.433 














0.145 0.265 0.272 0.230 0.232 0.314 0.288 0.286 




























0.307 0.889 0.737 0.601 0.529 0.961 0.833 0.841 0.811 0 0 


















0.332 0.386 0.390 0.380 0.377 0.467 0.361 0.388 




0.334 0.236 0.280 
Note: a With the exception of 1996 when the data come from March. 
Source: Own calculations based on data from data from the Z-12 survey on the structure of employment and 









PKD 2004, PKD 
2001, EKD 
1996 1998 1999 2001 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 
Agriculture 




4262990 4262733 4253440 4237474 4236651 2100522 2103645 2101462 
2342874 2345952 2353187 
Fishing 5038 5274 5421 4232 4417 4741 3872 3344 
Construction Construction Construction 733950 857189 839567 689733 635374 560628 664797 817493 850497 852906 808322 
Mining Mining and quarrying 
Mining and 
quarrying 
11359 20498 21581 37283 38494 36677 38155 41596 52890 54737 58586 




storage Transport, storage 
and communication 
240041 299892 345800 344422 367752 376673 427942 501204 
430163 470140 501489 
Information and 
communication 
224274 246506 281515 
Services 
Electricity, gas, steam 
and air conditioning 
supply Electricity, gas and 
water supply 
11548 14437 16107 23050 23499 31202 32766 47665 
45845 80081 71979 
Water supply; sewerage, 
waste management and 
remediation activities 













social security and 
health insurance 
796 1025 7941 1086 1168 949 1099 1238 1170 955 643 
Education Education 31055 37787 43814 45230 47114 52011 64295 80654 89889 113604 153796 
Human health and social 
work activities 
Health and social 
work 
45291 65675 83297 134215 145569 148163 166960 197950 221990 261677 298205 
Arts, entertainment and 
recreation 
Other community, 
social and personal 
service activities 
221487 203674 245360 205286 225269 240050 248844 263131 
39902 38571 33894 
Other service activities 199026 215064 257413 





Employee compensation (in PLN) in individual economic activities (private sector) in Poland, 1996-2014 
Dollery&Leong PKD 2007 
PKD 2004, PKD 
2001, EKD 
1996 1998 1999 2001 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 
Agriculture 




6425.52 10344.12 13872.24 18747.36 16027.68 20138.16 23365.08 29675.52 
30815.76 37382.88 39190.08 
Fishing 6735.72 9633.36 18559.44 21647.40 18943.80 18750.00 24553.32 29929.56 
Construction Construction Construction 8733.00 15618.36 21092.88 23967.72 23278.56 25211.76 29548.68 37676.04 38352.24 42083.28 45099.84 
Mining Mining and quarrying 
Mining and 
quarrying 
10234.20 21465.12 26681.64 41539.44 38986.08 40371.84 54702.60 60258.60 70917.24 72454.56 75434.76 




storage Transport, storage 
and communication 
10654.08 17436.96 24231.36 34818.60 35908.80 35535.96 36359.40 40694.40 
35394.00 37363.44 40164.00 
Information and 
communication 
78823.32 75536.04 83091.84 
Services 
Electicity, gas, steam 
and air conditioning 
supply Electricity, gas and 
water supply 
11527.08 18622.92 25090.20 31988.40 32909.04 37682.16 43687.08 53757.72 
62005.20 67323.84 75300.84 
Water supply; sewerage, 
waste management and 
remediation activities 













social security and 
health insurance 
9866.76 18691.44 64797.96 19831.92 31941.48 28171.44 62414.04 104072.52 103858.68 0.00 0.00 
Education Education 9432.60 16884.24 27345.24 26468.52 27430.20 32092.68 31240.08 35971.20 37511.64 40053.00 40686.96 
Human health and social 
work activities 
Health and social 
work 
5998.68 12672.60 17241.84 19834.08 19484.40 21417.24 27728.64 34065.72 38355.84 39340.56 43642.92 
Arts, entertainment and 
recreation 
Other community, 
social and personal 
service activities 
9024.12 14295.12 21102.96 24678.72 23355.60 29594.52 25547.52 38060.04 
34834.20 35171.52 35908.56 
Other service activities 27128.28 32880.12 35789.64 





Shares of “type I” workers in total employment in individual economic activities (public 
sector) in Poland, 1996-2014 (as of October) 
PKD 2004, PKD 
2001, EKD 
1996 1998 1999 2001 2002 2004 2006 2008 PKD 2007 2010 2012 2014 
Agriculture, hunting 
and forestry 
0.226 0.244 0.224 0.243 0.275 0.251 0.275 0.233 
Agriculture, forestry 
and fishing 
0.242 0.239 0.232 
Fishing 0.124 0.138 0.101 0.198 0.258 0.273 0.294 0.206 Mining and quarrying 0.102 0.073 0.083 
Mining and 
quarrying 
0.073 0.084 0.091 0.091 0.087 0.103 0.094 0.100 Manufacturing 0.210 0.193 0.225 
Manufacturing 0.208 0.229 0.237 0.242 0.233 0.223 0.233 0.228 
Electricity, gas, steam 
and air conditioning 
supply 
0.303 0.286 0.291 
Electricity, gas nad 
water supply 





0.267 0.253 0.291 
Construction 0.228 0.207 0.214 0.213 0.215 0.235 0.222 0.268 Construction 0.283 0.215 0.294 
Trade and repair * 0.662 0.615 0.636 0.637 0.739 0.675 0.583 0.709 
Trade, repair of motor 
vehicles * 
0.677 0.638 0.651 
Hotels and 
restaurants 
0.374 0.388 0.369 0.368 0.406 0.349 0.345 0.344 
Transportation and 
storage 
0.525 0.496 0.500 
Transport, storage 
and communication 
0.390 0.437 0.411 0.444 0.467 0.476 0.517 0.576 
Accommodation and 
catering * 
0.390 0.283 0.361 
Financial 
intermediation 
0.902 0.897 0.919 0.908 0.932 0.810 0.867 0.925 
Information and 
communication 
0.378 0.340 0.412 
Real estate, renting 
and business 
activities 
0.366 0.396 0.408 0.396 0.328 0.350 0.359 0.429 
Financial and 
insurance activities 





0.778 0.731 0.783 0.741 0.757 0.721 0.715 0.717 Real estate activities 0.643 0.546 0.654 
Education 0.157 0.155 0.152 0.153 0.151 0.152 0.170 0.164 
Professional, scientific 
and technical activities 
0.277 0.244 0.338 
Health and social 
work 




0.434 0.517 0.644 
Other community, 
social and personal 
service activities 





0.806 0.662 0.805 
         Education 0.125 0.130 0.142 
         Human health and 
social work activities 
0.174 0.158 0.189 
         Arts, entertainment 
and recreation 
0.330 0.334 0.367 
         Other service activities 0.399 0.409 0.526 
Note: a With the exception of 1996 when the data come from March. 
Source: Own calculations based on data from data from the Z-12 survey on the structure of employment and 






Employment (in persons) in individual economic activities (public sector) in Poland, 1996-2014 (as of the 31th of December) 
PKD 2004, PKD 2001, EKD 1996 1998 1999 2001 2002 2004 2006 2008 PKD 2007 2010 2012 2014 
Agriculture, hunting and forestry 95766 80927 68920 52226 44938 38996 36926 36961 Agriculture, forestry and fishing 33208 32088 31706 
Fishing 7827 7133 6219 2904 1879 867 709 449 Mining and quarrying 120081 119382 101649 
Mining and quarrying 327778 276520 235107 179250 170526 153126 143309 143016 Manufacturing 89036 66564 54221 
Manufacturing 1108225 574759 496551 291409 248006 187879 152846 127665 
Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning 
supply 
113324 63358 58537 
Electricity, gas and water supply 247837 238280 230815 222509 214582 194469 183681 165913 
Water supply; sewerage, waste management 
and remediation activities 
93833 93938 95760 
Construction 134731 81411 75436 47340 41157 28178 26122 22371 Construction 14731 14092 11675 
Trade and repair a 96988 57422 43842 32037 27679 19007 15529 13290 Trade, repair of motor vehicles a 9159 4141 2923 
Hotels and restaurants 29867 29506 29580 20281 17487 17601 16601 17332 Transportation and storage 271204 259868 242247 
Transport, storage and 
communication 
592225 559000 492440 369928 356910 328101 310724 307922 Accommodation and catering a 14829 14613 12106 
Financial intermediation 175421 163763 159247 77655 76493 72370 66853 65806 Information and communication 13476 12573 10602 
Real estate, renting and business 
activities 
205365 200668 177889 149342 173929 160081 145641 144161 Financial and insurance activities 49962 49251 49741 
Public administration and defence; 
compulsory social security 
401707 429775 431512 524660 837670 850658 879896 918143 Real estate activities 44330 39627 37806 
Education 880764 869981 864489 862712 847477 947485 962403 957847 Professional, scientific and technical activities 83087 78290 74894 
Health and social work 964325 955703 883713 734760 706096 556354 548426 549660 Administrative and support service activities 8910 9716 9649 
Other community, social and 
personal service activities 
143721 146405 143098 135658 140323 140460 145665 150702 
Public administration and defence; compulsory 
social security 
968930 957254 970504 
         Education 989961 972378 970360 
         Human health and social work activities 542434 528890 529054 
         Arts, entertainment and recreation 108536 108406 111026 
         Other service activities 1715 2553 2613 
Note: a Abbreviated name. 





Employee compensation (in PLN) in individual economic activities (public sector) in Poland, 1996-2014 
PKD 2004, PKD 2001, EKD 1996 1998 1999 2001 2002 2004 2006 2008 PKD 2007 2010 2012 2014 
Agriculture, hunting and 
forestry 
10231.68 17219.76 22698.12 28275.72 31846.92 32365.80 41777.64 43061.04 Agriculture, forestry and fishing 58527.12 71835.48 75780.12 
Fishing 8901.84 14495.64 15526.08 19497.48 25690.68 29534.04 30199.92 31176.00 Mining and quarrying 71183.64 80939.76 84754.80 
Mining and quarrying 18163.20 26122.44 34669.92 42738.48 45306.84 43262.88 52071.60 64389.36 Manufacturing 44385.24 52937.64 57167.40 
Manufacturing 10255.92 16551.72 22281.48 26707.08 26857.08 30941.88 34227.24 42255.12 
Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning 
supply 
57394.92 62104.44 65246.52 
Electricity, gas and water 
supply 
13677.60 19653.72 28123.20 31503.12 33163.20 33078.36 38911.08 45500.52 
Water supply; sewerage, waste 
management and remediation activities 
40813.56 44895.84 47196.12 
Construction 9185.52 16554.24 22035.24 26102.40 29307.72 29007.96 32350.56 44937.24 Construction 48845.04 57940.92 59622.60 
Trade and repair * 11521.56 19439.52 27125.40 29635.68 32422.08 31649.52 35985.96 44672.88 Trade, repair of motor vehicles * 50664.96 49873.80 65152.56 
Hotels and restaurants 10735.32 15847.80 20327.88 24053.28 21297.00 23605.80 25361.40 31769.88 Transportation and storage 42680.76 47116.80 48903.12 
Transport, storage and 
communication 
10134.00 16462.80 22612.44 27073.56 27899.52 28917.48 31954.92 40894.44 Accommodation and catering * 38082.24 40680.48 41277.72 
Financial intermediation 13631.64 20992.68 27135.60 40274.28 42636.72 47261.16 54180.60 62447.04 Information and communication 62706.12 73061.40 75097.92 
Real estate, renting and 
business activities 
11163.72 18108.00 24730.44 30038.04 28903.80 29144.40 35225.88 43929.12 Financial and insurance activities 76244.88 77701.92 80587.92 
Public administration and 
defence; compulsory social 
security 
12868.08 18886.20 26643.24 31144.92 32476.08 35726.88 40307.76 48449.40 Real estate activities 44949.84 46478.28 48500.76 
Education 9056.16 13786.92 19201.20 24388.44 26466.12 30376.44 31430.76 35947.56 
Professional, scientific and technical 
activities 
51268.68 58263.36 63197.40 
Health and social work 8350.92 12213.96 16171.08 19894.20 20815.20 22310.16 29223.36 36332.04 
Administrative and support service 
activities 
38261.64 38259.60 48627.84 
Other community, social and 
personal service activities 
10391.64 15693.24 22006.44 26030.64 26337.36 28512.00 30540.12 36761.52 
Public administration and defence; 
compulsory social security 
52013.28 54965.76 56993.64 
         Education 42048.24 46317.96 49238.40 
         Human health and social work activities 40063.92 42171.24 43875.00 
         Arts, entertainment and recreation 37518.36 39748.68 43161.96 
         Other service activities 35755.32 43463.88 48172.68 
Source: Own calculations based on data from data from the Z-12 survey on the structure of employment and wages; made available by Poland’s CSO. 
